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“NEW” MEDIA, PERFORMATIVE VIOLENCE, AND STATE 
RECONSTRUCTION IN MOGADISHU 
PETER CHONKA
1
 
Abstract 
Since 2012, Mogadishu has been the site of both unprecedented optimism around the re-emergence 
of the Somali state, as well as persistent violence perpetrated by the Islamist militants of Harakat 
Al Shabaab Al Mujahidiin (Al Shabaab). In attacking hotels and restaurants, as well as other sites 
broadly associated with the state, Al Shabaab has prosecuted a strategy intended to foment the un-
governability of the city, undermine the nascent Federal Government of Somalia‟s claims to 
authority, and denounce the alleged “foreign” capture of the re-emerging state. Based on 
discursive analysis of local political commentary, and fieldwork in Mogadishu, this article 
examines media contestation between a re-emerging state and an armed opposition in a context of 
prolonged political fragmentation. The article argues that not only does the highly decentralized 
and transnational modern media environment facilitate a dynamic and dialogic exchange of 
propaganda between the state and an armed opposition but, furthermore, the technological context 
of this discursive contestation has practical implications for the ways in which counter-terrorism 
and state reconstruction are undertaken by political and military actors on the ground. 
On 1 November 2015, Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujaahidiin (Al Shabaab) detonated a car 
bomb at the fortified gate of the Saxafi (‗Journalist‘) Hotel in downtown Mogadishu, opposite 
the Somali Police Force‘s Criminal Investigation Directorate. In the following hours, gunmen 
moved through the hotel killing their stated targets: politicians, members of state security 
forces, and other civilian bystanders. As this was happening, an Al Shabaab representative 
made direct contact with a foreign journalist to confirm their responsibility for the attack
2
. At 
the same time, pro-militant radio broadcast a live phone interview with the fighters who were 
themselves eventually overwhelmed by US-trained National Intelligence and Security 
                                                          
1
 PhD Candidate, University of Edinburgh, (p.j.chonka@sms.ed.ac.uk). The author would like to thank the 
editors and various anonymous peer-reviewers for their feedback and advice. He would also like to express his 
gratitude to Mogadishu University, all informants, and those friends and former colleagues who facilitated his 
fieldwork in the city. For reasons the article explains these individuals will remain anonymous.  
2
 BBC correspondent Mary Harper, Tweet, 1 November 2015, <https://twitter.com/mary_harper> (accessed 1 
November 2015, since removed). 
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Agency (NISA) special forces
3
. Seven other large hotels in Mogadishu have been directly 
attacked in a similar manner since 2014, some on more than one occasion, resulting in an 
estimated 150 fatalities
4
. Three months after the Saxafi Hotel attack, Al Shabaab militants 
stormed the Beach View cafe on Mogadishu‘s Liido beach killing 17 people, mostly civilians. 
The victims had been relaxing next to the white sands and turquoise waters of a beach that 
has become a potent symbol of the city‘s apparent rebirth, a testament to improved security, 
and the return of diaspora visitors and investors contributing to an apparent renaissance of the 
Somali capital
5
. Somali social media responded to the violence with the #tweetliidopictures 
Twitter hashtag, calling on users to post positive images of the beach being enjoyed by 
Mogadishu residents and visitors alike
6
.   
 These attacks – along with numerous others which have punctuated political and 
economic change in Mogadishu since 2012 – direct this article‘s focus towards the targeting 
of spectacular forms of political violence in the context of Somali state reconstruction and 
―new‖ media development. Following Tukefci and Wilson, new media is understood here as 
a ‗connectivity infrastructure [that] should be analyzed as a complex ecology rather than in 
terms of any specific platform or device‘7. Post Arab Spring scholarship has highlighted the 
influence of transnational satellite news television and social media on both the discursive 
context of political debate and opportunities available for popular mobilisation
8
. The 
                                                          
3
 Andalus Radio, „Idaacadda Andalus Oo Baahisay Codad Laga Duubay Walaalihii Fuliyey Howlgalkii Hotel 
Saxafi ‟ [Andalus Radio broadcasts recording of the brothers who carried out the Hotel Saxafi operation],  1 
November 2015 <http://radioandalus24.com/?p=5709> (3 November 2015). 
4
 Conservative estimate based on a survey of media reporting of average death-tolls of each attack. Figures vary 
between sources and consolidated data from multiple healthcare providers is limited. Estimate includes attackers, 
security forces and civilians.  
5
 Laura Hammond, ‗Somalia rising: Things are starting to change for the world's longest failed state‘, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 7, 1 (2013), pp. 183-193. 
6
 Abdi Latif Dahir, ‗Somalia‘s Lido Beach: the heart of Mogadishu and the place my friends died‘, The 
Guardian, 1 March 2016, < https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/01/somalia-lido-
beach-heart-mogadishu-place-my-friends-died> (12 April 2017).   
7
 Zeynep Tukefci and Christopher Wilson, ‗Social media and the decision to participate in political protest: 
Observations from Tahrir Square‘, Journal of Communication 62, 2 (2012) pp.363-379 (p.365). 
8
 Naomi Sakr, Arab television today (IB Tauris, London, 2007); Marc Lynch, ‗After Egypt: The limits and 
promise of online challenges to the authoritarian Arab state‘,  Perspectives on Politics 9, 2 (2011), pp. 301-310; 
Evgeny Morozov, The net delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom (Public Affairs, New York, NY, 2012); 
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emancipatory potential of decentralized media technologies is highly contested and debates 
increasingly emphasize the importance of the particular political environments in which such 
media networks have gained prominence
9
. As such, and in the Horn of Africa context, 
Gagliardone stresses the need to look beyond the media suppression/emancipation debates to 
understand a state such as Ethiopia‘s use of new media technologies for particular 
developmental priorities
10
. 
Neighbouring Somalia differs in that its Federal Government (FGS) does not 
represent an established and coherent authoritarian power adapting to (or taking advantage of) 
a changing media environment. Instead, state power is being slowly reconstructed in the 
context of a highly decentralized and fragmented electronic public sphere that has emerged as 
part of the telecommunications boom in the hitherto stateless economy
11
. Whilst an 
achievement of the FGS has been its communicative self-reassertion since 2012 through 
control of ―state‖ media such as Somali National Television or Radio Mogadishu, it is 
nonetheless bound to compete in a media landscape that it cannot dominate in any systematic 
fashion. Media is nonetheless highly important for state reconstruction, facilitating a ‗politics 
of participation‘ in the ongoing federal reconfiguration of the country and defining the scope 
of debate around ‗Somali-owned‘ constitution-making and post-conflict transition 12 . 
Elsewhere, studies of the Somali media ecology have illuminated commercial logics which 
underpin news production in a conflict environment, influencing patterns of violence against 
media workers and calling into question many of the normative assumptions of external 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Axel Bruns, Tim Highfield, and Jean Burgess, ‗The Arab spring and social media audiences: English and Arabic 
twitter users and their networks‘, American Behavioral Scientist 57, 7 (2013), pp. 871-898; Gadi Wolfsfeld, 
Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer, ‗Social media and the Arab spring: politics comes first‘, The International 
Journal of Press/Politics 18, 2 (2013), pp.115-137. 
9
 Lisa Anderson, ‗Demystifying the Arab spring.' Foreign Affairs 90, 3 (2011), pp.2-7 (p.2). 
10
 Iginio Gagliardone, ‗New media and the developmental state in Ethiopia‘, African Affairs 113, 451 (2014), 
pp.279-299. 
11
 Bob Feldman, ‗Somalia: amidst the rubble, a vibrant telecommunications infrastructure‘, Review of African 
Political Economy 34, 113 (2012), pp.565-572. 
12
 Nicole Stremlau, ‗Constitution-making, media, and the politics of participation in Somalia‘, Affrican Affairs 
115, 459 (2016), pp. 225-245. 
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observers around how journalists should and can operate in such settings
13
. In relation to 
other Somali political entities, Hill illustrates the opportunities presented by the use of 
information and communications technology to more consolidated state structures such as the 
secessionist Republic of Somaliland. Importantly, she highlights the significant limitations 
faced by state actors in their use of such tools in extending state power, as well as logics of 
consensus that may override the political necessity of expanding direct hierarchical control 
over security agents in peripheral regions
14
. 
This article expands on these insights and focuses on media technology use in a 
highly conflicted capital city where (unlike Somaliland) an armed opposition both 
substantively challenges the internationally-recognised state, and has past form in providing 
alternative forms of governance.  The article thus poses two questions. Firstly, how do the 
modern realities of Somali media (encompassing multiple overlapping ―old‖ and ―new‖ 
formats) affect a re-emerging state‘s ability to establish urban security control? Secondly, 
how do performances of targeted violence by militants both take advantage of – and reflect - 
this highly decentralized media ecology and contested ideological environment?  The use of 
media by militant actors is hardy new, and terrorism has long employed communication 
technologies to amplify its impact
15
. Nonetheless, this article argues that certain features of 
the modern Somali media ecology present novel dilemmas for state actors torn between 
asserting their discursive legitimacy in the public sphere, and waging effective ―counter-
terrorism‖ operations against a highly organised, brutal and media-savvy armed opposition.  
Al Shabaab‘s militancy is but one aspect of a complex security environment in 
Mogadishu. Numerous armed groups deploy violence in various constellations of political or 
                                                          
13
 Nicole Stremlau, Emanuele Fantini, and Ridwan Osman, ‗The political economy of the media in the Somali 
conflict‘, Review of African Political Economy 43, 147 (2015), pp. 43-57. 
14
 Alice Hills, ‗Off-road policing: Communications technology and government authority in Somaliland‘  
International Affairs, 92, 5 (2016), pp.1061-1078. 
15
 For an overview of these debates in the pre 9/11 and pre ‗Web 2.0‘ era see Paul Wilkinson, ‗The media and 
terrorism: A reassessment‘ Terrorism and Political Violence, 9, 2 (1997), pp.51-64. 
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economic cooperation or competition, albeit alongside the gradual and often faltering 
reassertion of coherent state power
16
. This case study demonstrates how media-influenced 
perceptions of political division and extraversion impact on the practical and discursive 
parameters of violent contestation in the city and over the state. Multiple actors (from 
diaspora returnees, foreign donors, ―peacekeepers‖, to international and local militants) 
compete for control over narratives of political reconstruction in a dynamic and highly 
internationalised media environment. Although such debates are increasingly characterised 
by transnational contestation over the cultural identity of Somali sovereignty, they are not 
driven by simple ―radical‖/―moderate‖, ―traditional‖/―liberal‖, ―Western‖/―African‖ or 
―local‖/―diaspora‖ binaries. Instead, they involve multiple representations of the relative 
―foreignness‖ of different cultural-religious orientations of state reconstruction.  
The modern media landscape of overlapping new and traditional forms of news and 
comment facilitates this ideological blurring. The analysis below, for instance, highlights the 
rebroadcasting of militant media within broader Somali news networks, and the process vice 
versa whereby jihadi communications make use of a much wider range of ―mainstream‖ 
source material. This complex bricolage of production cautions against reductive 
generalisations that portray modern media consumers or producers in clearly defined 
ideological dichotomies – either as ―radical‖ propagandists, ―nationalists‖, or passive 
audiences susceptible to ―brainwashing‖17. Recent scholarship on global militant Islamist 
media focuses on the content and recruitment potential of propaganda, and thus tends to 
reproduce clear ―War on Terror‖ distinctions between those consumers who have been 
                                                          
16
 Ken Menkhaus, ‗Non-state security providers and political formation in Somalia‘ (Centre for Security 
Governance Paper No.5, 2016). 
17
Willems and Mano emphasise this problematic tendency in African media studies: Wendy Willems and 
Winston Mano (eds), Everyday media culture in Africa (Routledge, New York, NY, 2017) pp.5-6.  
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―radicalised‖ and those who have not18. This analysis, by contrast, does not attempt to explain 
media ‗incitement‘ to violence 19 . Its contribution instead lies in its examination of the 
position of militant communications within a broader Somali-language media landscape; one 
that must be understood with reference to its technological emergence in conditions of 
statelessness and gradual, fraught reassertions of state power.  
Such complex ideological contestation over state reconstruction can be identified in 
the targeting, performance and broadcasting of spectacular acts of violence in the city. The 
‗performative‘ is understood here in Butler‘s terms as the ‗reiterative and citational practices 
by which discourse produces the effects that it names‘ 20 . The ways in which violence 
provokes security responses that themselves feed back into mediated political narratives is 
analysed below. Furthermore, violence is performed for different audiences to give it social 
meaning
21
, to communicate power, legitimacy and history to witnesses who may not be 
directly targeted by the act itself
22
.  Examining violence in the Israel/Palestine context, 
McDonald highlights the inadequacy of purely politico-economic explanations for violence, 
arguing that:  
violent performances, are laden with cultural meaning, drawn from a repertory of culturally salient 
forms and practices. These…constitute a poetics through which violence comes to take on 
meaning for its participants...Why do Palestinians choose to throw stones? Why has one specific 
pizza place in West Jerusalem been the site of no less than three suicide attacks since 2001?
23
  
                                                          
18
 J.M. Berger, ‗The metronome of apocalyptic time: Social media as carrier wave for millenarian contagion‘, 
Perspectives on Terrorism 9, 4 (2015), pp.61-71; James Farwell, ‗The media strategy of ISIS‘, Survival  56,6 
(2014), pp.49-55. 
19
 On the difficulty (or futility) of proving direct incitement by media even in a supposed archetype case see 
Scott Strauss, ‗What is the relationship between hate radio and violence? Rethinking Rwanda‘s ―radio machete‖, 
Politics & Society 35, 4 (2007), pp.609-637.  
20
 Judith Butler, Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of „sex‟ (Routledge, London, 1993) p.2 
21
 Bettina Schmidt and Ingo Schroder (eds.) Anthropology of Violence and Conflict. (Routledge, London, 2001) 
pp.5-6. 
22
 Neil Whitehead, ‗Introduction: Cultures, conflicts, and the poetics of violent practice.‘ in Neil Whitehead (ed) 
Violence (James Currey, Oxford, 2004) pp.25-54. 
23
 David McDonald, ‗Poetics and the performance of violence in Israel/Palestine.‘ Ethnomusicology 53, 1 (2009), 
pp.58-85. (p.59). 
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Why, then, does Al Shabaab attacks hotels in Mogadishu? Why attack civilians at 
Liido beach in a manner that would cause great outrage amongst a large proportion of the 
Somali population, given the importance of the location for the ‗Somalia rising‘ narrative? 
Such attacks against icons of ―progress‖ in Mogadishu, constitute communicative contestation 
with the FGS and engage with wider popular multi-media debates around the character and 
ideological orientation of re-emerging Somali statehood.  
After a reflection on methodology and data collection, a historical contextualisation of 
iconoclastic Islamist violence in Mogadishu is provided. This is followed by an overview of 
FGS state reconstruction since 2012, the modern Somali media environment, and practical 
political and security implications of media competition between the state and militant 
opposition. The final section examines the targets of performative violence themselves and 
the ways in which they illuminate wider popular political debates around state reconstruction. 
The successful completion in February 2017 of the selection process for the new Parliament 
and President Maxamed Cabdulahi ―Farmaajo‖24, presents an opportune moment to analyse 
the security challenges faced by the previous administration and acts of Al Shabaab violence 
that were designed to derail this transition. Although their failure to do so is notable, many of 
the same constraints face an apparently popular new president attempting to consolidate 
modest security and political gains made by the previous administration.  
 
Methodology and data collection  
This article is based on six months of doctoral fieldwork undertaken in Mogadishu (and 
elsewhere in Somalia) in 2015. Since 2012, I had been working in the same environment for a 
major international humanitarian organisation where part of my duties involved media 
monitoring of conflict dynamics and militant communications. Confidentiality prevents me 
                                                          
24
 Faduma Abukar Mursal, ‗Somali elections online: View from Mogadishu.‘ Horn of Africa Bulletin 29, 1 
(2017) pp.5-8. 
8 
 
from using data encountered during that period, however interactions with state and 
international political and security actors, and extensive movements around governmental 
compounds in the city help contextualise the media texts I discuss below. Reflecting on 
political violence and state reconstruction witnessed both first-hand and through local media 
commentary, my critical discourse analysis ‗focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, 
confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society‘25.  
Willems and Mano critique accounts of African media cultures which overplay the 
agency of digital media producers and consumers, arguing that textual and audience-focused 
methodologies remain useful for generating new accounts of media reception and production 
from the ‗vantage point‘ of non-Western contexts26. This article attempts to conceptualise the 
coexistence and overlap of so-called old and new media within a wider Somali public sphere. 
State and armed opposition agency is thus analysed in terms of their engagement with this 
truly multi-media environment. The difficulties faced by researchers such as myself 
undertaking systematic audience studies in Mogadishu are compensated for with a focus on 
the discursive character of a range of local-language media texts, and analysis of relationships 
between certain spaces of media consumption (targets such as hotels and cafes in particular 
areas of the city) and certain types of violence.  
As such, I was a resident of a hotel inside the city during my fieldwork, and my 
movements were limited by security constraints. Nonetheless, in my previous employment I 
had been fairly mobile and was privileged to see much of the dynamic and changing city. 
Meeting informants at the hotel (particularly journalists) and inserting myself into the distinct 
hotel milieu has informed my reflections of targeted urban violence. The hotel where I was 
based had been attacked in the past. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this was one of reasons I 
chose it, as it could be assumed that it was unlikely to be targeted again. This rationale is left 
                                                          
25
 Teun Van Dijk, ‗Introduction: what is critical discourse analysis?‘ In Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen & 
Heidi Hamilton (eds) The handbook of discourse analysis. (John Wiley & Sons, London, 2001) p.353. 
26
 Willems and Mano, Everyday media cultures in Africa, pp.8-10. 
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purposively opaque to avoid giving further information that would disclose the location. The 
analysis below emphasises the political sensitivity of these potential targets and this explains 
the anonymity given to this location and all informants.  
 
Iconoclastic Islamist violence in a conflicted capital 
Visual and discursive links can be drawn between recent patterns Al Shabaab violence in 
Mogadishu and previously publicised acts of religious iconoclasm. Understanding the types 
of violence focused on in this article requires the historicising of wider cultural-religious 
shifts that shape the modern ideological space in which Al Shabaab operates today. Modern 
Islamist mobilisation in Somalia dates back to resistance against the assertive secularism of 
former dictator Siyaad Barre‘s ‗scientific socialist‘ agenda, and remained an undercurrent of 
post 1991 attempts to restore political order in the aftermath of state collapse and civil war
27
. 
Talk of Islamist involvement in the actual fall of Siyaad Barre, or popular resistance to the 
United States‘ intervention in the post state-collapse period is certainly overplayed by modern 
Somali jihadis. Nonetheless, acts of religious iconoclasm such as the destruction of 
Mogadishu Cathedral highlighted the spectre of religio-political violence and a desire to 
energise what remains a Somali Ummah defined by a near universal adherence to Islam
28
. 
The emergence of Islamist governance structures in southern Somalia from the late 
1990s both conditioned, and was conditioned by, shifts in popular religious practice away 
from Sufi-influenced forms of ―traditional‖ Somali Islam to more conservative doctrines of 
Sunni orthodoxy and increased emphasis on public piety. Al Shabaab has emerged out of a 
long-running history of Islamist mobilisation dating back to the activism of groups such as Al 
                                                          
27
 Abdurahman M. Abdullahi, ‗Women, Islamists and the military regime in Somalia: The new family law and 
Its implications‘ in Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (eds) Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali 
Culture, Society and Politics (Hurst, London, 2010) pp.137-160. 
28
 Cabdishakuur Mire Aadam, Kobocii Islaamiyiinta Soomaaliya [Rise of the Islamists in Somalia] (Graphic 
Lineups, Nairobi, 2013). 
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Itixihaad Al Islaami and the eventual establishment of the Union of Islamic Courts
29
.  This 
political-judicial experiment was overthrown by the Ethiopian invasion of 2006, an 
intervention which precipitated the rise of Al Shabaab as a splinter of the Courts, framing its 
struggle as resistance against the historical Ethiopian Christian foe. During the subsequent 
period, in which the group established structures of administrative governance across large 
swathes of Southern Somalia, numerous acts of religious iconoclasm were carried out against 
various Sufi-associated targets, particularly tombs of locally revered Saints
30
.  
Following its expulsion from Mogadishu in 2011 by African Union (AMISOM) and 
Transitional Federal Government forces, and their progressive loss of urban territory since 
then across South-Central Somalia, Al Shabaab has increasingly relied on the use of 
asymmetrical violence. Their military strategy in Mogadishu has involved targeted 
assassinations of subsequent Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) or government-
associated figures, the use of mobile mortar fire against locations of state authority, hit and 
run attacks on government checkpoints or convoys, and ―complex‖ suicide assaults against 
ministries, hotels and restaurants.  
It is also necessary to situate modern Al Shabaab violence in Mogadishu in the 
context of broader popular interpretations of post civil-war social fragmentation and a 
contentious politics of land and power in the Somali capital
31
. In the early 1990s, Mogadishu 
witnessed some of the worst civil war violence, culminating in what Kapteijns describes as 
‗clan cleansing‘ targeting those (even loosely) connected with the lineage group of the former 
                                                          
29
 Cedric Barnes, and Harun Hassan, ‗The rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts‘, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 1, 2 (2007), pp.151-60; Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of 
a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 (Hurst, London, 2013). 
30
  BBC Somali, „Shabaab oo burburineysa qabrigii Shiikh Maxamed Biya Maaloow‟ [Shabaab destroying tomb 
of Sheikh Maxamed Biya Maaloow], 25 March 2010 
<http://www.bbc.com/somali/news/story/2010/03/100325_sawirro_qabriga_biyomaaloow.shtml> (June 28, 
2016). 
31
 Rift Valley Institute/Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, ‗Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement, ownership 
and displacement in a contested city‘ (RVI/Heritage Institute Report, Nairobi, 13 April 2017). That the authors 
chose to remain anonymous is indicative of the tension surrounding this type of conflict in the city.  
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dictator
32
. Much of the modern contestation over land and property in the city can be traced 
back to this period of violence and group displacement. With regard to the current conflict 
and ―federal‖ state reconfiguration, suspicions of political intrigue often engage with an 
institutional politicisation of clan. The much debated ‗4.5‘ system allocates governmental 
seat quotas in on the basis of the four major Somali ―clan families‖, with a half share for the 
beesha shanaad (fifth clan) of ―minorities‖. This account cannot do justice to the complexity 
and fluidity of clan-based political identifications or the relationships between genealogical 
identifications and material political or economic agency
33
. Nonetheless, it must be 
recognised that ideas of conspiracy discussed below may take on a clanic-hue, regardless of 
taboos that exist around the use of direct clan hate-speech
34
.  This tension is linked to the 
semi-institutionalisation of clan in the language of state politics and news media (for instance 
the listing of clan affiliations of ‗4.5‘ appointed politicians in print newspapers)35 and the 
ways in which control of the capital may be discussed in the public sphere by elite actors in 
terms of competing interests of the major clan-families
36
. Furthermore, Al Shabaab‘s agency 
may itself also be characterised in this way as conspiracy theories circulate across the wider 
public sphere of an acutely divided Somalia about the political utility of their violence for 
certain (clan-defined) actors
37
.  
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 Lidwien Kapteijns, Clan cleansing in Somalia: The ruinous legacy of 1991 (University of Pennsylvania Press 
Philadelphia, PA, 2012). 
33
 Abdi Ismail Samatar, ‗Destruction of state and society in Somalia: Beyond the tribal convention‘ The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 30, 4 (1992), pp.625-641; Cedric Barnes ‗U Dhashay—Ku Dhashay: Genealogical 
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34
 Lidwien Kapteijns, ‗Making memories of Mogadishu in Somali poetry about the civil war‘ in Lidwien 
Kapteijns and Annemiek Richters (eds) Mediations of violence in Africa (Brill, Leiden, 2010) pp.25-74.  
35
 Xog Ogaal newspaper, „Magacyada, qabiiladaiyo jufooyinka ay ka soo jeedaan wasiirada, wasiiro ku 
xigeenada iyo wasiiru-dowlayaasha‟ [The names, clans and positions of ministers, vice ministers and state 
ministers], 8 February 2015 
36
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2016). 
37
 Muuse Xaji Abees, Dunida Online, „Digniin culus ku socota xildhibaanada daarood‟ [Strong warning to 
Darood MPs] 20 July 2014  <www.dunidaonline.com/index.php?id=12999> (19 September 2016). 
12 
 
State reconstruction, counter-terrorism and media competition 
With the essential support of AMISOM, the FGS has succeeded in establishing a modicum of 
security and political control over all of the districts of the capital. Formal or, at least, 
daylight Al Shabaab control of neighbourhoods in Mogadishu ended with their expulsion in 
2011, and security is managed by an amorphous mix of forces which are part of, or are 
aligned with, the FGS. These include the Somali Police Force, the National Intelligence and 
Security Agency (NISA), the Somali National Army, AMISOM troops and police, as well as 
militias of local District Commissioners, and a burgeoning local and international private 
security industry. Whilst this combination of actors brings with it its own internal tensions, 
the fact that the state has at least nominal authority over all districts marks a change from the 
pre-2011 reality of widespread Al Shabaab control and the division of the city into separate 
neighbourhood fiefdoms dominated by militias unaligned to any central government.  
With the promise of greater security and political cohesion, the local economy has 
gone through a visible period of growth, driven by ―returnee‖ diaspora investors and 
infrastructure projects undertaken by high-profile international donors, such as Turkey. 
Nowhere is such dynamism more evident than on important arteries of the city such as the 
Makka Al Mukarama thoroughfare, running from the airport road all the way up to the 
Parliament building and the Villa Somalia Presidential compound. The newly re-paved roads, 
lined with the colourful hoardings of recently opened shops, banks, restaurants, hotels, and 
outdoor tea stands, speak to an increased sense of consumer and investor optimism. All of the 
large hotels that have been attacked by Al Shabaab in the city since 2014 have been located 
along (or just beyond) this politically symbolic route that connects the seat of the FGS with 
the international airport and the fortified AMISOM/UN presence there
38
.  
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 Author‘s mapping of hotel locations. Al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Cali Dheere explicitly noted the Makka 
Al Mukarama thoroughfare as a primary target for hotel assaults, asserting the political significance of the route. 
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On the national political front, the FGS in Mogadishu has played an important (if 
varied) role in the ongoing creation of the new federal states
39
, now at different levels of 
consolidation. As of February 2017, the (delayed) indirect process designed to replace the 
current legislative and executive branches of government has been largely completed. This 
involved clan elders in new federal regions in the selection process of MPs who then elected 
the new President. Al Shabaab‘s strategy of targeting hotels (where many electors and 
candidates were based) provided a serious test for security forces. Although Al Shabaab 
succeeded in undertaking deadly attacks against locations such as the Dayax Hotel (on 25 
January 2017) the wider selection process in Mogadishu was completed.  
In representing a relatively substantive departure from earlier transitional governance 
arrangements - but in the absence of popular elections – the 2012-2017 FGS was required to 
pay close attention to its presentation of legitimate authority and attempted to gain control 
over a narrative of securitisation, re-establishment of governance structures and the fight 
against terrorism. State media such as Somali National Television (SNTV) and Radio 
Mogadishu compete with multiple local FM radio stations, foreign-based Somali-language 
radio and television broadcasters (including the BBC‘s Somali Service and Universal TV), 
innumerable local news websites and several print newspapers. Internet access (including via 
smart-phones) is prevalent in Mogadishu, a result of the telecommunications sector boom in 
the wider, and hitherto largely stateless, Somali economy
40
. There is significant overlap 
between ―traditional‖ media (in the form of newspapers, FM radio broadcasts, satellite 
television) and online news or ―social‖ media, with virtually all content finding its way online. 
This multiplies possibilities for consumption and reproduction, and the interface between 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See Dalsoor Media, „Wareysi Qaybtii 1aad: Sheekh Cali Dheere‟ [Interview Part One: Sheekh Cali Dheere] 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJwuw-H0mgs > (12 April 2017)  
39
 Jason Mosley, ‗Somalia‘s federal future: Layered agendas, risks and opportunities.‘ (Horn of Africa Project 
report, Chatham House, London, 2015).   
40
 Survey data from local commercial research firm Datagrid reports 97% phone ownership amongst Mogadishu 
residents of all 17 districts, with 56% of the sample (386) owning smartphones. Datagrid Report (June 2015) 
<http://datagridsomalia.com/media/Telecom_Survey_Summary-Final-email.pdf>  
14 
 
social media platforms and conventional news media broadcasters is examined below. Clear 
distinctions are also often difficult to make between informal and state media, in that 
Government authorities largely communicate in through the same channels – and on a 
comparable footing – with producers in the private sector. For instance, although the use of 
social media by state security forces shows the FGS‘ sensitivity to the need to win ―hearts 
and minds‖, this could also be seen as a degradation of its sovereign prestige: the FGS‘ 
National Intelligence and Security Agency‘s @HSNQ_NISA Twitter feed (with its 6225 
―followers‖), for example, operates merely as one voice in highly fragmented discursive 
space
41
 and opposition responses are often almost instantaneous.  
The state projects its interlinked narrative of political reconstruction and counter-
terrorism through the broadcasting of documentaries (on state television and social media) 
presenting the conspiratorial nature of Al Shabaab militancy within Mogadishu 
communities
42
.  Such films feature dramatic shots of elite FGS forces in full battle-gear, 
engaging the enemy over an action movie-esque soundtrack. The ‗patriotism‘ of the FGS 
forces is emphasised along with the warning to the population that the state will seize 
property rented to Al Shabaab, a practice justified by clerics‘ reference to Islamic law. The 
FGS frequently broadcasts footage of its battlefield or intelligence successes, including 
interviews with captured operatives and judicial processes (up to and including executions) of 
either alleged Al Shabaab members or government forces accused of killing civilians.  
This relationship between the media and state counter-insurgency actors in 
Mogadishu has been critiqued by prominent local commentators such as the former head of 
the BBC Somali Service, Yusuf Garaad
43
. He points out the negative effects on intelligence 
gathering and criminal prosecutions of allowing (or even encouraging) journalists to 
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interview suspects of attacks shortly after their capture
44
. On this dynamic media battlefield 
the state is torn between attempting to present its forces‘ successes whilst actually 
prosecuting an effective counter-intelligence operation against a foe which has infiltrated all 
levels of society and, at times, state and security forces themselves
45
. Regulating flows of 
information in this conflict-setting can often have tangible implications for protagonists or 
those caught up in the violence. Elsewhere, Garaad lambasts rolling media coverage of 
ongoing attacks (including the use of Twitter by eager journalists) for putting more lives at 
risk, and being capitalised on by attackers who can use such updates to predict security forces‘ 
responses
46
.  
At times the state attempts to take direct charge of the conflict narrative. In May 2015, 
the Head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) made a public ‗request‘ to 
the media in Mogadishu to stop using the name ‗Al Shabaab‘ and instead use the Somali 
acronym ‗UGUS‘ (‗Organisation for the Slaughter of the Somali Ummah‘)47. While this 
somewhat clumsy directive illustrated the importance placed by the state on media narratives, 
it also highlighted the limitations of its sporadic control of the industry. The dynamic and 
almost real-time dialogue between the state and militants was amplified by multiple non-
aligned online media sources which broadcast Al Shabaab‘s response with their own ‗UGUS‘ 
acronym (labelling the FGS as the ‗Organization for the humiliation of the Somali 
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Ummah‘)48. Furthermore, aside from the irony of its announcement on ‗World Press Freedom 
Day‘, its ambiguity was troubling for local media given the FGS‘s past attacks on journalistic 
freedom. Since its establishment, there have been several high profile arrests, detentions, 
prosecutions and convictions of journalists in Mogadishu, ostensibly for the reporting of 
information that has incited popular discontent directed against the state. This has included 
the prosecution of journalists for reporting rape allegations against government forces, or 
against media networks such as Shabelle Radio, targeted for broadcasting Al Shabaab 
statements or vox-populi-esque programming of uncensored public opinions which, the FGS 
has claimed, is tantamount to incitement of inter-clan violence in the city.  
The FGS‘s ambiguous relationship with the internationalised pan-Somali news media 
was illustrated by a 2015 confrontation with Universal TV, arguably the most popular 
Somali-language satellite television channel, broadcast from London across the entire region. 
A director and journalist were arrested and held for 6 days by NISA after the broadcasting of 
a debate featuring two members of Parliament, one of whom made provocative statements 
about Somalia being under the ‗colonial‘ control of neighbouring powers. Both the debate 
and the subsequent arrests were picked up by pro-Al Shabaab media, spun to verify their 
frequent claims of external dominion over Somalis
49
 . 
Although such examples illustrate the state‘s ability (and willingness) to restrict press 
freedom, this does not extend to control of Al Shabaab‘s media capabilities. In February 2016, 
the Office of the Attorney General put pressure on local internet service providers to block 35 
websites deemed to be a threat to national security. The companies eventually complied, but 
restricted access to only 29 of these sites. The remaining 6 were Al Shabaab-affiliated and the 
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companies refused to block them on the basis that the FGS could not provide guarantees for 
their security from possible retaliation
50
.  
The ways in which the emerging state attempts to utilise social or popular media have 
implications for the extent to which it is able to consolidate a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence. An example of this dilemma – illustrating state media agency and the role of 
journalists not only as communicators but combatants - occurred in early 2016.  Xasan 
Xanafi, a journalist affiliated with Al Shabaab‘s Radio Andalus, had been extradited to 
Somali from Kenya to face trial for his involvement of the killing of several other media 
workers in Mogadishu between 2007 and 2011. Prior to him being sentenced to death by the 
Military Court, Somali National Television (in collaboration with NISA) released a 
documentary on the case featuring a lengthy confession from the accused in custody
51
. Two 
months later Xanafi was executed by firing squad. This was, essentially, a public execution - 
pictures from local journalists appeared in Twitter newsfeeds as it occurred. Unlike in other 
photographed executions at Mogadishu‘s General Kahiye Police Academy, the condemned 
man‘s face was initially photographed un-hooded. It is conceivable that this was part of the 
state‘s performance of justice for this highly publicised case involving a very recognizable Al 
Shabaab-affiliated individual.  
Considerations of appropriate judicial process (or affronts to basic human dignity) 
aside, this case demonstrates both the capacity and challenges faced by the state in waging a 
public discursive battle against Al Shabaab in ―state‖ and ―social‖ media. The very 
broadcasting of Xanafi‘s confession enabled the construction of a counter-narrative by pro-Al 
Shabaab propagandists who purportedly obtained a voice recording of Xanafi in custody 
distancing himself from what he alleged was a forced confession at the hands of local and 
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Western intelligence operatives. Released as another video documentary on Youtube, the film 
was less concerned with Xanafi‘s alleged guilt but rather the role of foreign security 
agencies
52
. Characteristic of other highly internationalist jihadi propaganda material, the film 
featured edited reportage from the UK‘s Channel Four News – a piece by British-Somali 
journalist Jamal Cusman on foreign detention and interrogation in Mogadishu
53
. The film was 
promoted via pro-jihadi websites, although it is claimed to be the work of ‗Journalists for 
Justice‘. Distinct from the organisation of the same name in Kenya, this group has little else 
in the way of an online footprint and is likely a front for jihadi sympathisers. The film is 
bilingual (Somali audio/English subtitles) and the organisation behind its production is 
branded in the style of an international human-rights advocacy group. Aside from 
demonstrating the range of formats employed by anti-state elements in their propaganda, this 
example highlights the constant discursive interaction, via ―social‖ and ―official‖ media, 
between the state and the armed opposition, or their supporters. Such counter-narratives feed 
into (and further condition) a public sphere highly responsive to conspiracy theories and the 
frequent invocation of external agendas. 
As evidenced above, the state communicates in a public sphere where the armed 
opposition has the capacity to broadcast widely online and, arguably, produces material of a 
higher level of technical polish. Al Shabaab communicates to multiple audiences both 
domestically and internationally through numerous platforms
54
. These include ―official‖ 
audio-visual broadcasting from Al Shabaab‘s Al Kataib media-wing, often featuring 
battlefield footage from embedded jihadi journalists narrated in English or Arabic; 
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nationalistic Somali-language  propaganda documentaries about life under Al Shabaab rule 
from affiliated media networks such as Al Furqaan; radio broadcasting across areas still 
under their control; and via numerous pro-jihadi websites. Audio and video recordings with 
prominent spokesmen (particularly following major attacks) are reproduced across jihadi 
cyberspace and in the wider media. Often mainstream local news producers (who may not 
directly identify with the group‘s Jihadi-Takfiri ideology) reproduce such high-profile media 
products, in that they are deemed newsworthy in themselves and will thus generate internet 
traffic for online news sites
55
. 
Whilst terrorism has always relied on media coverage to amplify its effects, the 
simultaneity of multi-platform communications around militant operations in modern 
Mogadishu illustrates the novel circumstances faced by a weak state in managing a highly 
decentred electronic media battlefield. As noted in the introduction, during the assault on the 
Saxafi Hotel, an Al Shabaab spokesman made direct contact with BBC Journalist Mary 
Harper to confirm their responsibility, while at the same time pro-Al Shabaab Radio Al 
Andalus broadcast a telephone interview with the fighters inside the hotel shortly before their 
apparent ‗martyrdom‘. Such coverage is designed to illustrate the control that the attackers 
have achieved, and the language used in their communications echoes this formal military 
discourse. Phrases (in Somali) such as ‗the Forces of the Mujahidiin have captured‘ or ‗are in 
full control of [the space in question]‘ are frequently used and convey the sense that the 
attacks are not merely characterised by senseless violence, but rather the explicit taking and 
holding of space from state authorities
56
. Nonetheless, the kamikaze nature of the raids is 
apparent with the dispassionate acknowledgement that whilst the attackers will attempt to 
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hold this space for as long as possible, they will not be coming out alive. The juxtaposition of 
transcendental ‗martyrdom‘ themes alongside the calculated and impersonal language of 
military ‗operations‘ is characteristic of an insurgency which discursively blends spiritual 
appeals to mobilisation alongside the presentation of an organised, disciplined and state-
aspiring militant structure.  
The contact made with a foreign journalist illustrates Al Shabaab‘s awareness and 
utilisation of external media channels. Despite aligning themselves against all western 
enemies, the group‘s propagandists frequently reference (or translate into Somali) English 
language media reporting or analysis that emphasises their military capacity or the 
deficiencies of the FGS
57
. Their sensitivity to international focus on Mogadishu - as a 
symbolic site in the struggle for the reconstruction of the Somali state - is highlighted by 
certain choices of targets, which is where the analysis now turns. 
 
The politics of performative violence: targets  
As Al Shabaab‘s targeting has shifted towards fortified locations such as hotels and ministries, 
their attempts to justify violence take advantage of the physical and cultural detachment 
popularly perceived to exist between elites and the wider population. Suspicions of political 
intrigue are often characterised in terms of what goes on behind the walls and barricades of 
the hotels in which politicians work and live. The wider threat of political violence and 
assassinations means that many politicians (particularly those who do not hail from 
Mogadishu itself) base themselves in heavily fortified hotel compounds. The myriad 
conspiracy theories which circulate in the public sphere regarding the machinations of 
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political elites and their external patrons often make reference to mobile actors ensconced 
behind hotel walls
58
.  
In a self-published Somali-language article entitled ‗The newspaper seller of 
Mogadishu‘, Cabdishakuur Mire Aaden, a former Puntland politician, media owner, writer, 
and political commentator, describes an encounter with the eponymous vendor at a hotel 
cafe
59
. He laments the boy‘s poverty and comments on the attitude of the elites (MPs, 
businessmen whose children live in diaspora) with whom he is sitting drinking coffee. ‗What 
shocked me the most‘ he notes ‗is that little Cabdiraxman [the boy] was met not with 
compassion but suspicion, and much of the talk was about whether he had been sent [to the 
hotel] by ‗the children‘ [Shabaab]‘. Mogadishu, he says, is characterised by fear. On 
February 20, 2015, the writer was killed in an Al Shabaab attack on the city‘s Central Hotel, 
along with up to 24 others
60
.  
 During my time in Mogadishu, informants would often remark that the number of 
people out on the streets - congregating to drink tea, listen to the radio and read newspapers 
around hotels, businesses, universities and government Ministries - was a clear barometer of 
the perceived level of the threat of violence. Whilst major Al Shabaab attacks continue to 
occur on a sporadic basis, the general trend of increasing numbers of people coming out in 
public to do business and socialise (even at night) has been maintained. The re-emergence of 
―everyday‖ day urban life is a key component of the ―Mogadishu rising‖ narrative and, as 
such, public space has acquired a politic salience. Al Shabaab‘s asymmetrical mode of urban 
warfare has made social destabilization and a derailing of this narrative a key priority. The 
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targeting of restaurants or cafes being opened with diaspora finance or by returnees has been 
justified both on the grounds that these locations were haunts of members of the ‗apostate‘ 
government and the accusation that such places were hotbeds of vice and inappropriate or 
―culturally‖ unacceptable behaviour. Mogadishu‘s Liido beach has been associated with 
tensions manifest in the wider public sphere regarding the scope and nature of transnational 
influence on the re-emerging Somali state, particularly in cultural-religious terms. Opinion 
pieces in the wider Mogadishu media reference the beach and hotels as sites where politicians 
(often returned from the diaspora) promenade with female ‗assistants‘ in contravention of 
local norms of appropriate public conduct
61
.  
Such moral condemnations are echoed by Al Shabaab spokesmen and play into 
tensions surrounding the role of external diaspora returnees perceived to be dominating re-
emerging state structures
62
. Whilst there is popular appreciation for many of the benefits that 
returnees bring to a re-developing capital city, a locally articulated distinction between qurbe-
joog (diaspora) and qorax-joog (locals, ‗those who stayed in the sun‘) at times focuses on the 
capital, skills and international connections enjoyed by the former and their ability to take 
greatest advantage of new economic opportunities in Mogadishu
63
.  
Another element of this discursive contestation over ―foreignness‖ playing out on the 
can be seen in local and diasporic critiques of external mainstream media portrayals of 
Somalia. During my fieldwork, I published a blog post entitled ‗Beaches or bombings?‘ 
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reflecting on my experiences in the city and tension between foreign media accounts of 
violence and a Somali counter-narrative that emphasized a city rising rapidly from the ashes 
of conflict - an optimism epitomized by an Instgrammed Liido beach
64
. With the 
aforementioned attack on the Beach View Cafe, these two tropes intersected in a way that, for 
all its horror, was not unpredictable. The narrative contestation continued in the immediate 
aftermath of the attack with a call for Somali social media-users to #tweetliidopictures, re-
asserting the targeted beach as an icon of hope, peace and development for Mogadishu and 
Somalia.   
Although there exists an important public sphere discourse criticising manifestations 
―un-Somali‖ or ―un-Islamic‖ liberal social practice brought by a returning diaspora, critiques 
of Al Shabaab may also describe its militancy and salafi/takfiri-jihadi ideology in terms of 
foreign importation at odds with ―traditional‖ Somali Islamic practices. In this sense, 
discursive contestation goes beyond simple local/foreign binaries and engages a much more 
complex struggle for definitions of modern ―Somali‖ cultural identity in the context of state 
reconstruction.  
 Al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu against the Ministry of Culture and Higher 
Education were partly justified in terms of the government‘s collusion with foreign agencies 
in developing educational materials to promote democracy and ―un-Islamic‖ behaviour. 
―Democracy‖ in the Somali jihadi discourse is conflated with secularism, social liberalism 
and various practices deemed foreign and un-Islamic. Al Shabaab propaganda frequently 
links the military invasion of Somalia by ‗Westerners‘ and both black and white ‗infidels‘ 
with a cultural-religious attack on Somali, Islamic tradition and custom
65
. The state‘s 
propaganda campaign against Al Shabaab does not engage specifically secular discourses for 
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the reconstruction of the Somali state and, ideologically, current power-holders in Mogadishu 
are generally orientated towards various factional brands of political Islam. The growing 
influence of Islamic-world patrons such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey further conditions 
and complicates the ideological context Somali state reconstruction
66
.  
Although there is little nostalgia shown for the secularism of Barre‘s pre-1991 regime, 
the FGS is taking on the nationalist mantle of the former unified Somali state. As such, it 
performs its sovereignty (and the fiction of ―national‖ control) through ceremonies and 
institutions that hark back to anti-colonial struggles and commemorations such as those for 
the independence days of the former British and Italian Somalilands
67
. Nonetheless, the 
realities of the FGS‘ dependence on external patrons often leave it open to the common 
charge that it remains beholden to neo-colonial influences. A short documentary by 
aforementioned journalist Jamal Cusmaan‘s Dalsoor Media entitled ‗Re-colonising Somalia‘ 
is illustrative of this type of critique as it accuses the European Union – extraterritorially 
ensconced in their Mogadishu airport ‗Green Zone‘ HQ – of following a no-hire policy for 
Somali workers
68
.  
That these places are conceptualised as lying beyond Somali sovereignty is, in part, a 
result of the targeting of violence highlighted above. Al Shabaab has a proven capacity to 
penetrate into this most secure sector of the city and the security concerns that have 
influenced this alleged EU policy help reinforce the militants‘ own narrative. A self-
perpetuating cycle of destabilisation, barricading and segregation unfolds, allowing 
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propagandists to emphasize the ‗extraversion‘ inherent in this type of securitised 
extraterritoriality and highlight external actors‘ detachment from the interests of the wider 
population
69
. Although the reporter in this example is no Al Shabaab affiliate, it is 
unsurprising that this particular documentary has been publicised via pro-jihadi media. Once 
again, this highlights the blurring of boundaries between what might be called Somali 
―mainstream‖ and ―jihadi‖ media producers70. 
 
Conclusion  
Esser points out that focus on ‗spectacular‘ attacks, often directed against ‗international‘ 
targets, can draw attention away from endemic forms of violence that have a quantitatively 
greater impact upon ordinary citizens, particularly marginalized groups
71
. This is an 
important insight, especially in regards to the value of such narratives for actors with vested 
interests in falsely portraying a city as being ‗secure‘ with the exceptions of sporadic 
‗terrorist‘ violence. Nevertheless, this article has argued that a close reading of the politics of 
performative violence in Mogadishu (not simply through the binaries of a ―Global War on 
Terror‖ vocabulary) can generate insight into multi-dimensional contestation for re-emerging 
political authority playing out in a dynamic, decentred and often uncontrollable media 
environment.  
The relationship between the discursive and the practical implications of mediated 
violence in Mogadishu has been highlighted, for instance, in the ways in which attacks 
precipitate further physical barricading and segregation in the city, which in turn enable 
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militant propagandists to emphasise the alleged extraversion of Somali sovereignty. The 
intersection of transnational multimedia production and brutal, spectacular violence 
demonstrates that the public sphere does not merely constitute a discursive sideshow to ―real‖ 
politics, but instead serves as a tangible arena of conflict that continues to define trajectories 
of ongoing Somali state reconstruction. The role of new media ecologies in contexts of 
prolonged armed conflict and political fragmentation deserves further comparative analysis, 
particularly with other cases where the scale of destruction hampers re-emerging and 
embattled state structures‘ ability to control narratives of political legitimacy. The data 
presented here from Mogadishu begins to illustrate the some of the novel dilemmas a state is 
faced with when choosing to engage (and fight) in a modern public sphere that has itself 
emerged from prior conditions of statelessness and conflict. 
 
 
